While the outcome of this year’s elections will be extremely important to Kenyans, regardless of the outcome, the effects will be felt far beyond the country’s borders. Tens of millions of Africans will be watching to see how the elections are conducted. Will it be a truly free, fair, and nonviolent process, or more of the same?
At the moment, all one can do is wait and see.
Jean Mensa, chair of the Electoral Commission of Ghana, who headed a US Agency for International Development-funded pre-election assessment mission co-sponsored by the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, told the Ghana News Agency that the assessment indicated that “the 2022 general election had the potential to be a pivotal milestone for democratization in Kenya.”
Kenya, already suffering an economic decline from the pandemic, cannot afford the additional socio-economic disruption caused by post-election violence. As one of East Africa’s largest economies, if Kenya suffers, so will the rest of the region. There is also the demonstration effect that a poorly run Kenyan election will have on other countries on the continent.
In addition to the Kenyan general elections, major elections are slated for Angola and Senegal, which are likely to influence the political trajectories in each country. In Kenya and Senegal, increased tensions and violence are likely. Other elections scheduled for 2022 are Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tunisia. Some of these elections, including Mali and Sierra Leone, were postponed in 2019 and 2020 due to the pandemic.
Role of international partners
With the turmoil surrounding America’s own 2022 mid-term elections, the United States is unlikely to be able to wield much influence in Kenya during this election season. Moreover, official Washington is preoccupied with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Except for some interest in Russian activities in Africa, it is doubtful if many in the Washington policy establishment are even paying much attention to Kenya at the moment, even though Kenya is a key American partner in the region.
Ruto was able to meet with the assistant secretary for Africa, Molly Phee, during an unofficial visit to the United States earlier this year. But other than the Kenyan press, no public mention was made of the visit on the official Department of State web site. The only recent official mention of Kenya, in fact, is a March 18, 2022 ‘Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet’ that outlines the general US policy on Kenya, with emphasis on the US strategic interest in Kenya’s security and stability and the bilateral partnership on regional and global security issues.. Regarding the 2022 elections, the second paragraph of the fact sheet reads:
Ethnic-based political divisions, interference in key institutions, corruption, and impunity have posed challenges to Kenya’s democracy. In the wake of widespread violence following the disputed 2007 presidential election, Kenyans adopted a new constitution in a national referendum in August 2010, which mandated the transfer of some federal political authority and funding to Kenya’s 47 counties. Kenya’s 2013 and 2017 elections were more peaceful, though concerns remain about the independence and credibility of democratic institutions and the government’s adherence to the rule of law. Kenya’s next election is scheduled for August 2022.
The only mentions of Kenya on the White House website are releases in 2021 concerning President Joe Biden’s meeting with Kenyatta during the latter’s visit to the United States.
Until the Clinton administration, the US-Africa relationship could be characterized as benign neglect, focused mainly in terms of countering Soviet efforts to gain influence on the continent. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations ushered in serious and sustained engagement which enjoyed remarkable bipartisan support in Congress. The Trump administration took office signalling a radical break with this consensus and a return to the pre-Clinton situation. While aid levels to countries in Africa remained relatively consistent during the first three years of Trump’s administration, the public and private rhetoric expressed scepticism about our programs in Africa.
The administration embraced a short-term, transactional approach that signalled changes in how the United States would engage with Africa. Its Africa strategy, for example, mentioned China and Russia, but did not name one African country. In his speech on the strategy to the Heritage Foundation in December 2018, John Bolton, Trump’s national security advisor, stopped just short of saying that African countries would have to choose between the United States or China, reminding many of the Cold War
“us or them” days.
The Biden administration came in with a promise to reverse the disdain and neglect of the previous administration, and usher in a policy of “solidarity, partnership, support, and mutual respect.” Former senior intelligence official Judd Devermont was hired in October 2021 to craft the administration’s Africa policy. As of March 2022, the policy document still had not been finalized. It is estimated that it will be completed before the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit, planned for some time after the middle of 2022.
Until the United States has an approved and implemented Africa strategy, it is left to organizations like the African Union to help countries conduct credible elections and prevent election-related violence. It can use the expertise and knowledge it has accumulated over many years of election observation to help maintain stability. As in many parts of the world over the past ten years, democracy in Africa is weakening, with entrenched autocrats attempting to hang onto power. In a country that, like the continent, is overwhelmingly young (approximately 42 percent of Kenya’s population is age 14 or younger), the failure to address pressing socio-economic and political issues is a recipe for further violence. (