How a failing Somalia is likely to affect economies across the Horn and East Africa region

By Abdihakim B. Mohamed

In 2008, Lehman brothers, a giant US investment bank, imploded, spinning the financial systems out of control, and leaving a trail of turmoil that affected businesses and the US economy. The financial and economic tremors quickly spread in key global markets, triggering what some described as parallel to the great depression. Global economy caught a fever, from the sneezing of the Lehmann brothers. 

The phrase, too big to fail, hitherto, largely confined to the finance and business circles, was thrust to the fore and became a frequent jargon in the midst of the financial chaos. Having bailed out other teetering entities, there was little political will to come to its aid on the part of the US government. Lehman brothers, a 158-year-old company, was left on its own, and with little to salvage the situation, it coiled and died.

Somalia could be facing its Lehman brother’s moment in a different way. Given its strategic location, its history and its resources, failure in the country will likely mess up economies across the Horn and East Africa region. 

Ethiopia and Kenya, as two countries neighbouring Somalia, could be shaken by insecurity situation synonymous with Somalia, primarily from Al Shabaab group. In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia citing threats to its national security by the Islamic Courts Union, the predecessor to Al Shabaab. 

Like the too big to fail entities, Somalia cannot be ignored – the country is navigating a very lengthy, delicate and bumpy electoral process, so much, that it needs impactful and targeted support. The presence of African Union forces, and more than a decade in spearheading stabilisation efforts in Somalia is a pointer to the important place the country occupies in the region. 

Meanwhile, the international community have played a significant role in lending multi stream support to Somalia in a bid to finalise the much-delayed presidential election. For the elections to be concluded, various approaches should be used to encourage the Somali actors across the divide. 

Political agreement, commonly referred to as the Sep 17 2020 agreement, would be a good starting point. Deviation, or signalling flexible attitude towards this agreement may be construed as signpost for spoilers to manoeuvre for new machinations, and cause new disruptions and delays. The political agreement should offer a solid guide on how to reach a conclusive election of leaders.

Somalia is a recovering country, and based on a system of clan representation where each clan has to be represented in the legislature. Excluding a certain region or section will easily, and invariably metamorphose into excluding a clan, given the interchangeable nature of constituency (which is constitutional) and clan in the context of the country. 

Constituency exclusion will come with its own negative spiral. Ranging from forming a rebellious region within the state or an enclave that severs working relations within the federal member state, or even with the federal government. Or in some instances form a “clan/constituency protection alliance forces” to safeguard the interest of the entity involved, when its apparent that representation exclusion will severely undermine clan and constituency wellbeing and interest.

In extreme case, representation exclusion may lead to crossing over and joining hands with violent and anti peace groups, which could see entire regions slipping from government control. The setback from this plausible scenario will likely injure the confidence of ongoing peacekeeping and stabilisation efforts, and an unsettling blemish on the initiatives of the last two decades, besides impacting governance journey and transitioning security responsibility to Somali forces.

Consequently, robust mediation efforts should continue to ensure all parliamentarians are elected, sworn in and participate in the legislative business of the house including the election of the President. 

The two elections implementation bodies – State Implementation Election Team (SIET) at the state level, and Federal Implementation Election Team (FIET) –, at the federal level run day to day election business in the country. The SIET will submit the list of candidates elected at their respective jurisdictions to the FEIT, for onward submission to the joint secretaries of the two houses in preparation for swearing-in of the members-elect. 

With the exception of Jubaland and Hirshabelle regional states, others have concluded the elections. Whereas Hirshabelle state may conclude its process without much contestation, Jubaland will require robust engagement to finalise her election process.

Concerns about insecurity in Somalia affecting her neighbours such as Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia can not be ignored. 

As the elections move to the final stretch, it is important for FEIT to remain independent while operating within the standard electoral rules. Any slight partisanship on the part of the FEIT will trigger major crisis, just as the election process is almost shepherded to the finish line. 

The delay of elections for two years has disrupted reforms as well as development – Somalia relies on donor prop up to plug in gaps in funding for government activities and projects, besides capacity building initiatives. The overly delayed elections have had substantial effects on governmental projects.

Admit it. Somali’s economy is suffering and ordinary citizens are bearing the brunt because of Covid-19 effects, and General Election delays. Moreover, a debilitating drought is being experienced across the country, with a heavy impact on rural populations and livestock. Somali professionals should come together and ensure that the political agreements reached are achieved. Although the country’s economy has weakened, its stability will go along way – East Africa countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and even Ruanda are expected to gain.    

The writer is a geopolitics and security consultant