October 2014 will mark exactly three years since Kenya launched Operation Linda Inchi, a military onslaught against the Al Shabaab terror group based in Somalia. The militants had heightened their activities within Kenya’s territory causing insecurity that threatened tourism, one of Kenya’s economic lifeblood.
Prior to the military incursion, the bloody Al-Shabaab had made sporadic forays into Kenya, especially in the Coast and northern parts, and killed locals apart from kidnapping foreign tourists, aid workers and public servants.
The killing of British tourist David Tebbutt, a publishing executive, and the kidnapping of his wife, Judith, from the comfort of their hotel room at the exclusive Kiwayu Safari Village in Lamu in September 2011 was the straw that broke the camel’s back, so to speak. A month later, a French woman was taken from her Kenyan home and two Spanish aid workers kidnapped from Dadaab refugee camp.
Instructively, the intent of Kenya’s invasion was therefore to rid the war torn country of the militia and thus ensure the security of our frontier regions. A stable and functioning Somalia would translate to a terror-free Kenya, a flourishing tourism industry and a vibrant shipping sector. It would mean a buoyant economy not just for Kenya but the East Africa region as a whole.
The intent and purpose of the incursion, even in the face of the cost involved, was therefore noble. What comes to question nearly three years on is whether its initial objective has been achieved – or is being achieved.
On the contrary, however, security has deteriorated in Kenya since the onset of the military maneuver. If anything, the intensity and magnitude of terror attacks has upped ever since.
In the Northern Kenya, it is not just insecurity that is worrisome, service delivery and economic activity have nearly come to a standstill. The Al Shabaab militia continues to target security officers and other government officials in that part of the country.
Hardly all; there have been numerous terror attacks right in the heart of Kenya, including Nairobi and Mombasa cities despite KDF’s adventure in the neighbouring Somalia.
In fact, the Al Shabaab raid last September on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall is increasingly seen as poignant statement to the Kenyan government that Kenya Defense Forces’ presence in Somalia could not deter the militiamen from hitting our soul.
The Westgate incident, and more so Kenya’s response to it, turned out to be one of the most embarrassing security lapses in Kenya’s post-Independent history.
The recent Mpeketoni attack that left over 60 people dead is so far the worst this year.
Tourism, already reeling from travel advisories by major source countries and the massive booking cancellations, has been the most hit. Most Kenya’s long-term development partners no longer see the country as safe. Foreign Investors are, more than ever, preferring our neighbours in the region at our expense.
Thus, KDF’s presence in Somalia has made Kenya more insecure and three years down the line, there is no likelihood things will change for the better. This incursion is no longer worth its cost. It has not achieved its purpose.
Sadly though, for obvious reasons, KDF may not be in a hurry to advise its Commander-in-Chief, Uhuru Kenyatta on the need to pull out. Indeed, ever since Kenya’s troops were placed under the Africa Union Mission to Somalia where they now earn hefty allowances for serving, vested interests have taken the centre-stage.
It is time Kenya audits its adventure in Somalia. The backdrop of the increased violence at the hands of the Somali militia has left a good number of Kenyans convinced that the military should pull out of Somalia and instead concentrate on securing the country from within its borders.
We are not advocating for immediate pullout, but the President needs to come up with a time frame within which Kenyan troops will come out of Somalia.