Somalia: From uncertainty to insecurity
Allies and donors express confidence that progress is being made. However, news indicates deteriorating security within Mogadishu
By Andrew J. Franklin
Somalia is fragmenting into autonomous clan-based statelets even as the United Nations and the “usual suspects” – the Western nations and multilateral agencies that hold conferences to pledge additional funds (seldom dispensed) – express continued support for the Federal Government barely in control of Mogadishu.
Somalia’s allies and development partners demonstrate their confidence that progress is being made by reopening long closed embassies – albeit heavily fortified and minimally staffed. However, latest news points to a rather rapid retreat from the recently reopened compounds due to deteriorating security within Mogadishu.
The subject of the self–declared independent Somaliland is only mentioned as a hindering resolution of the Somalia conundrum.
Somalia disintegrated 23 years ago following the ousting of Siad Barre, the pro–American – previously pro–Soviet – dictator. Barre’s Central Government controlled Somalia for nearly 20 years.
AMISOM: War on the cheap
AMISOM has an authorized total military and police strength of nearly 20,000, including support troops and logistics elements. However, its mandate was severely constrained and militarily indefensible.
Troop numbers were kept too low for any effective offensive action against Al Shabaab and were barely sufficient to enable AMISOM to provide for its own security and to prevent the militant group from overrunning areas of Mogadishu nominally under the control of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
Despite increases in authorized personnel, AMISOM’s force structure and budget excludes any air support or maritime capabilities. This absence of war fighting capabilities, integral to any successful military operation whether conventional or conducted in low intensity counter insurgency situations, is mind boggling and inexplicable.
In effect, highly trained, disciplined Uganda Peoples Defense Force and Burundian forces have been deliberately kept at the same level of war fighting effectiveness and combat power as Al Shabaab!
Since the AMISOM mandate and budget is ultimately dictated by the UN Security Council (essentially the US, Great Britain and France) it seems that defeating Al Shabaab, restoring peace and security to Somalia and reducing the spread of Islamic insurgency and radicalism in the Horn of Africa have never been achievable objectives of what is ostensibly a military exercise.
Al Shabaab may not have any air support but apparently has unlimited stocks of conventional munitions including RPG anti–tank rockets AK 47s, and mortar bombs. Al Shabaab has no shortage of military grade explosives to fabricate IEDs some of which have been transported across into Kenya.
KDF and AMISOM, just who needs the other?
Operation Linda Nchi was launched with limited objectives and was to be of relatively short duration – more of a punitive expedition, to retaliate against Somali insurgents killing and kidnapping experts as well as foreign tourists on Kenyan soil. Two months later, it was obvious that Operation Linda Nchi had failed to rescue anyone and the Kenyan border was as porous as ever.
In fact, the government had already developed an “exit strategy” which involved officially joining AMISOM! And it increased troop strength to over 4,600 apparently for financial reasons and to counter any additional International Criminal Court (ICC) difficulties!
However the KDF has made airstrikes on targets in Sector Two and its F-5 ground attack jets, helicopter gunships and transport assets – paid for by the US – are useful to AMISOM albeit in a very limited manner. Nevertheless Kenya is clearly an important component of AMISOM and should use its influence to ensure that its aviation assets are integrated within the AMISOM Force Command Structure.
Kismayu capture effect on global anti-terror war
KDF officially came under AMISOM command as of 20 August 2012. Thus, Operation Linda Nchi became a “campaign” subject to strategic direction of the AMISOM Force Commander in Mogadishu. It became disturbingly obvious this KDF “exit strategy” was much more about money – getting someone to pay for an unplanned, unlimited and open–ended mission that had failed to close the porous border, recover the abductees or punish Al Shabaab.
The Jubaland Project of a functioning buffer zone providing security to modern Kenya without actually closing the porous border was also deemed a strategic objective. Kismayu was seized on September 2, 2012, however, there was no peace dividend and Al Shabaab attacks inside Kenya have continued to escalate.
West’s role in prolonging uncertainty
The immediate concern of foreign governments was both humanitarian and, thereafter, commercial as Somali pirates operating from numerous fishing ports began seizing more and more ships.
Added to the annual international must-have conferences has been a discussion of whether Somalia should be a centralized federal state, a system of Swiss-style cantons, a confederation of autonomous states, a constellation of statelets (mostly clan–based) or a mixture of all or none of the above. There is also an annual renewal of the AMISOM mandate and photo opportunities all around.
PIRACY
An entire industry developed mainly in Kenya initially to negotiate ransoms whose proceeds seemed rather welcome in Kenyan banks or for investment in property development. The cost of Somali piracy annually was estimated at KSh615 billion (higher insurance premiums, shipboard security enhancements that ultimately included well paid armed mercenaries based on board ships to deter pirates). The additional costs were passed on to the ultimate consumer and although incidents of piracy off Somalia declined, the costs to prevent any resurgence remain high.
The deployment of formal national naval units to protect shipping was heavily publicized in order to discourage piracy but their efficiency is purely speculative. Furthermore the capture of Kismayu was irrelevant in fighting piracy.
The foreign naval units are organized in a confusing array of unified command structures, independent ships deployed by such sovereign states as India, South Korea and a myriad of other states who operate without any consistent mandates, strategies or coordination. However whether under EU Command, NATO command or without command, one aspect is ships operating to suppress Somali piracy are generally prohibited from any land based operations.
These military vessels will not eradicate piracy because their own countries’ protocols prohibit any attacks on mainland villages where the pirates are based.
The failed Seal Team Six raid on Baraawe on October 6, 2013 to “snatch” an Al Quada leader and the disastrous French helibone raid three months earlier to rescue an intelligence agent abducted by Al Shabaab in 2009 highlight the reluctance of the West to put “boots on the Somali ground”.
The long-term solution
The only way to effectively eliminate piracy is to impose consistent law and order along the entire 1,000km coast line of Somalia. A Federal Coast Guard operating a fleet of well-armed and technologically advanced equipment recruited nationally and deployed to bases that are divorced from clans’ consideration is the obvious solution to re-establishing Somalia’s control over all of its internationally recognized, sovereign Indian Ocean territory.
This Federal Coast Guard could be patterned on today’s US Coast Guard which has evolved since 9/11 into a professional paramilitary organization with sufficient weaponry and combat skills to launch aggressive naval operations without sacrificing any of its previous capabilities. A Federal Coast Guard, regardless of its upgraded combat capabilities, is of little threat to the self – devolving autonomous clan – based statelets which means there should be no proliferation of competing “navies.”
There continues however to be a notion that there needs to be a “conventional” Somali National Army (SNA) controlled by the Federal Government in Mogadishu; apparently the lack of this sort of expensive and unnecessary Federal establishment diminishes Somalia as a modern nation.
The solution is a Federal Constabulary – a GSU on steroids – without Main Battle Tanks or heavy artillery. Although recruited nationally and trained to enforce national laws such a constabulary would see most of its members based in their clan areas. By definition these police units would enforce anti–piracy laws on land since this constabulary is supposed to fight all crimes.
Ultimately there would need to be a heavy complement of foreigners serving in leadership, command and staff positions much as has been done by the Sultans of Oman or Brunei who relied on units made up entirely of non–citizens on contract. While this arrangement initially would offend modern sensibilities concerning neo colonization, mercenaries and imperialism, Somalia is a special, unique case that requires bold – albeit not terribly modern – decisions to reduce Al Shabaab from growing as a regional threat and to promote social development and the reestablishment of non – existent state functions in such areas as health, education, common legal systems, commerce and trade.
WHAT IS BEST FOR KENYA?
The Government of Kenya (GOK) needs to determine what solutions are best for Kenya within the context of the Horn of Africa. The porous border with Somalia must be closed with Kenyan troops assigned to AMISOM being withdrawn from Sector Two into a Wajir Forward Combat Base from where their AMISOM role can be more effectively accomplished. Ultimately this combat base would accommodate the counter–insurgency and border control elements of the National Police Service as well as appropriate Intelligence units.
The government of Kenya needs to present a credible funding proposal to the US and the EU showing how doing things the way it wants to will push back Al Shabaab and Al Queda. The funding will be made available but the western allies need Kenya to initiate the process and commit itself to implementing its own security– related legislation.
Otherwise, as Somalia devolves into some sort of Mad Max anarchy, AMISOM will simply continue doing what it has been doing and Kenya will become yet another part of the regional theatre in the US led Global War on Terror.
Finally Kenya’s foreign policy should clearly favour support for the self – devolving mini-states albeit within the context of Somalia’s international boundaries. This may involve more diplomatic, economic and social contacts with Somaliland, Puntland and any number of semi–autonomous mini-states.
One caveat that Kenya can certainly insist upon is the establishment of the Federal Coast Guard and deployment of Federal Constabulary elements as well as a prohibition on what is becoming an arms race that threatens to create militaries not only to protect “disputed” zones but also menace neighbors (Djibouti and Kenya). This policy must be clear, comprehensive and applied equally for the ultimate benefit of Kenya as a whole.
The writer is Managing Director, Franklin Management Consultants Ltd.
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