Ruto’s headache in changing the Constitution

Political and ideological polarization stand in the way of constitutional amendments

By Silas Apollo

Any administration, upon gaining power, must come up with a new set of rules to help drive its campaign promises, and help it deliver on its mandate; the Kenya Kwanza administration is currently in the phase of crystallizing these rules. 

Over the last couple of months, President William Ruto has already called for Constitutional amendments, a move he says will enrich the country’s democratic process and improve service delivery.

The President, in his proposal, wants the creation of the office of the official leader of opposition, amendments in the law to speed up the implementation of the elusive two-thirds gender principle, as well as changing the Parliamentary standing orders to allow cabinet secretaries to appear before MPs for questioning.

In the proposals sent to both the National Assembly and the Senate through a memorandum in December last year, the Head of State has also expressed his support to have the National Government Constituency Development Fund, and the Senate Oversight and National Government Affirmative Action Funds anchored in law.

These amendments, the President has argued, will not only help his administration govern better and deliver on its promises but also help improve the country’s democratic process as well as promote governance and accountability for future administrations.  

The President has also argued that other changes, such as the creation of the office of the leader of the official opposition, will help enhance transparency and accountability and seal loopholes experienced by previous administrations, including that of his predecessor, President Uhuru Kenyatta. 

Similarly, the President is of the view that by speeding up the implementation of the two-thirds gender principle, the government will have fulfilled a provision of the law whose enactment has been a bone of contention between the various arms of government since the promulgation of the Constitution in 2010.

But even as debate on the said changes continues to pick up steam, others have already expressed their opposition to the move, casting doubts on whether the Head of State will actually realize his dreams of amending the Constitution.

Others have also singled out Dr. Ruto’s previous opposition to similar initiatives to amend the Constitution, including the Building Bridges Initiative proposed by Mr. Kenyatta while he was in office.

While opposing the BBI process, which had, among other things, proposed the creation of the office of the leader of the opposition as well as a mechanism for the implementation of the two-thirds gender principle, Dr. Ruto back then described the move as a non-priority. 

Dr. Ruto had also argued that pumping in billions of shillings to the BBI process at a time when the economy and many in the country were facing economic difficulties was ill-timed.

The President is, however, adamant that the current proposals will take a less costly and divisive approach to the referendum, a move he says will be initiated through Parliament.

This, he says, will also help the process bypass the legal hurdles experienced by previous processes, including the BBI initiative, which was annulled by the Supreme Court on the basis that it was initiated by the President in his private capacity

But opponents of the initiative are accusing the President of double-speak and hypocrisy, arguing that any attempt to change the Constitution will not only be a mutilation of the law, but will also be resisted. 

Law Society of Kenya president Eric Theuri, while opposing the proposed changes last year, accused the President of an attempt to destroy the Constitution, adding that proposals such as the creation of the office of the official leader of the opposition would be a duplication of roles. 

“We have a system of government that is largely presidential, and the president comes from the coalition that forms the majority and there is another coalition that forms the minority. That is the structure that we picked for this country. You cannot, therefore, introduce the office of the leader of the opposition. 

“That amendment in itself does not conform to the current constitutional structure that we have. It should not even be discussed in Parliament,” Mr. Theuri added. 

More recently, Senate Speaker Amason Kingi has rejected calls to amend the Constitution to operationalize the Senate Oversight Fund. “Changing the Constitution to operationalize the fund is a dangerous path, and the House will reject such attempts,” Kingi said and expressed his confidence that the fund will become operational soon with being subject to a constitutional amendment.

The President also faces the risk of running into serious opposition with his opponents, such as ODM leader Raila Odinga, who have also expressed opposition to the proposed changes.

Mr. Odinga, who alongside Mr. Kenyatta birthed the failed BBI process, has argued that amending the Constitution cannot be done through a Parliamentary process as proposed by the President but through a popular initiative. 

He has also dismissed the proposed amendments, accusing the President of his hypocrisy on the matter following his opposition to similar initiatives in the past, including the BBI. 

Dr. Ruto, on the other hand, says that changes such as the creation of NG-CDF will help facilitate development in disadvantaged regions, improve the construction of many schools, and offer bursaries for tens of thousands of pupils and students across the country.  (  

In five elections (DRC, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe), incumbents seek a second term. There is only one open seat in Nigeria, as President Muhammadu Buhari steps down after his constitutionally mandated second term.

There is a broad spectrum of trajectories in which these elections may lead. Some provide crucial opportunities for consolidating democratic progress. Others face uneven electoral playing fields and must overcome the institutional legacies of one-party rule.

In every case, there are illustrations of democratic resiliency. This is seen in the actions of civil servants, judges, political parties, citizen groups, security professionals, and journalists—who, often at great risk, collectively aspire to strengthen and uphold norms of civic discourse, popular participation, and fairness. This is particularly evident in the dynamic role that youth are playing in many of these elections—a reminder that 70 percent of Africa’s population is under the age of 30.

Given the central role that governance plays in security in Africa, the stakes from these elections are high—not just for democracy but for stability and development. Since governance norms, insecurity, and economic dynamism are rarely contained by borders, the conduct and outcomes from each of these elections will also have implications for their neighbors and the continent.

Nigeria: Presidential and Legislative, February 25

The electoral context in Africa’s most populous country and largest economy is characterized by juxtaposing forces of deteriorating security alongside substantive efforts to maintain the trajectory of electoral reforms that Nigeria has realized for every election since its reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1999.

The security environment is typified by a diverse array of challenges ranging from militant Islamist groups continuing their destabilizing attacks in the northeast to the widespread criminal banditry and violence in the northwest, farmer-herder violence in the Middle Belt, separatist agitation in the south, persistent attacks on the country’s oil infrastructure, maritime insecurity, and police violence. 

Parallel to the heightened security concerns, notable electoral reforms are underway. The Electoral Act of 2022 allows electronic voting and transmission of election results that are expected to improve transparency and reduce opportunities for vote rigging. It also mandates the recording of ballots at Nigeria’s 176,000 polling stations prior to their transmission to Abuja. This electoral best practice, prominently displayed in Kenya’s 2022 presidential elections, allows real-time monitoring of electoral results by citizens and watchdog groups, increasing the integrity of the process. Based on the successes of off-cycle elections in Ekiti and Osun States in 2022, INEC Chairman Dr. Mahmood Yakubu said Nigeria’s 2023 elections will be the most transparent yet.

The electoral outcome may hinge on the mobilization of the youth vote. The median age in Nigeria is 18, and more than 40 percent of the 94 million registered voters are under 35. Youth unemployment is more than 50 percent, and youth comprised 75 percent of the 9.4 million newly registered voters. Digitally savvy and building on their driving role in the #EndSARS police reform protests, Nigerian youth are highly motivated for this electoral cycle, and indications are that they are most receptive to the calls, notably by Peter Obi, for greater government responsiveness to citizen priorities and enhanced transparency.

The Nigerian elections, in short, will be a test on multiple levels. First will be whether the electoral reforms that have been instituted contribute to an outcome that most Nigerians view as credible. Second will be whether the mechanisms of democratic self-correction—the opportunity to switch leaders and policies to adapt to shifting circumstances—will work sufficiently to identify and empower Nigeria’s new leader with the legitimacy and vision to enable one of Africa’s most vital countries to chart a new course forward to address the serious security and economic challenges it faces.

Sierra Leone: Presidential and Legislative, June 24

With a per capita income of $500 and roughly 60 percent of the population falling below the poverty line, this country of 8.6 million people has been particularly vulnerable to the economic shocks caused by the COVID pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Inflation has risen to 30 percent over the past year, food prices have increased by 50 percent, and fuel costs have doubled. This has caused enormous strains for the majority, who have little buffer to meet their daily needs. Nearly three out of four Sierra Leoneans are food insecure. Finding it difficult to make ends meet, doctors and teachers have gone on strike for pay increases.

Political tensions have been elevated since the 2018 legislative elections when Bio’s Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) party challenged 10 seats won by the opposition All People’s Congress (APC). In 2019, the High Court ruled in favor of the SLPP petition alleging electoral fraud. As a result, the contested seats automatically shifted to the runner-up SLPP candidates. This resulted in a flipping of the majority in the unicameral legislature to the SLPP by a 58 to 57 margin.

A new wrinkle in the 2023 legislative elections is that they will be run under a proportional representation (PR) rather than the customary constituency-based first-past-the-post electoral system. The APC had challenged the legality of the change put forward by the SLPP; however, the Supreme Court ruled in January 2023 that the shift in the voting system was constitutional. Critics are concerned that a PR system will further concentrate power in the hands of party leaders. Just five months before the election, this change will require parties to adjust their campaigns while introducing a new element of uncertainty. While it has a reputation for fairly administering its duties despite financial limitations, the revised selection procedures will also require rapid adaptation by the National Election Commission.

Zimbabwe: Presidential and Legislative, July-August

ZANU-PF has held a stranglehold on the presidency since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. Seven-term president/prime minister, Robert Mugabe was ousted in a 2017 coup by former army chief General Constantino Chiwenga. ZANU-PF retained continuity with the installation of former Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa as President. Chiwenga defended the unconstitutional exercise by saying, “when it comes to protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in.”

The deployment of political violence in Zimbabwe continues a decades-long pattern—from the liberation movement days known as “Chimurenga.” It was marked by incidents such as the Matabeleland massacre in the 1980s, the mysterious killings of rival politicians inside and outside of ZANU-PF, and the multiple beatings longtime opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai suffered in the effort to unseat Mugabe.

What is noteworthy in the 2023 cycle is how early the violence against the opposition has started. The faction now in control of the ZANU-PF is also increasingly dropping any pretense that violence is not part and parcel of the party campaign playbook. This may reflect the more central role the military has played in the party since the coup. While the ZANU-PF governing model has long been built around a politicized military, known as “securocrats,” this relationship has fostered fraught civil-military relations that pose a formidable obstacle to democratic progress. The increasingly harsh methods against the opposition may also reflect lessons Mnangagwa learned as head of the Joint Operations Command under Mugabe, which the latter used to target political rivals with abductions, arrests, and killings. 

This perspective is reinforced by widely held perceptions that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is biased, with leading ZANU-PF family members serving as commissioners. ZEC’s reputation also suffers from the outsized role of the military, where 15 percent of ZEC staff are former service personnel, including the chief elections officer, a retired army major. Contrary to electoral best practice, ZEC has refused to publish an electronic copy of the electoral register to foster transparency.

This pattern of institutional bias builds on a long history of election engineering in Zimbabwe, including limiting the number of polling stations in opposition strongholds, challenging the credentials of opposition candidates, and filing criminal charges against others—all to prevent them from standing for office.

Gabon: Presidential and Legislative, August

Following the script of an established 7-year ritual, Gabon’s 2023 presidential elections are expected to be a tightly controlled affair leading to the predictable outcome of President Ali Bongo Ondimba’s continuation in office. With the abolishment of term limits in 2003, Bongo became president for life. It is a mantle he inherited in 2009 from his father, Omar Bongo Ondimba, who held the office for 42 years, reflecting the de facto hereditary dynasty of this oil-rich realm in the heart of the Congo Basin rainforest.

Executive branch control over the institutions responsible for elections—the National Autonomous and Permanent Electoral Commission, the Interior Ministry, and the Constitutional Court—directly contributes to the predictability of electoral outcomes. The discretionary approach toward elections was evident in the repeatedly postponed National Assembly elections that were held in 2018 after originally being planned for 2016.

One dimension of corruption that Gabon has been relatively effective at curtailing is illegal logging. With 85 percent of its land area covered in tropical rainforest, Gabon is a part of the Congo Basin, often referred to as the world’s second green lung after the Amazon. As a result, environmental governance policies by Gabon have regional and international implications. Known as a “green superpower” for its pioneering conservation and sustainable logging policies, Gabon is one of the world’s few net absorbers of carbon, potentially holding lessons for other countries seeking to protect their carbon-rich and ecologically valuable land areas.

Liberia: Presidential, October 10

Liberia’s 2023 elections are shaping up to be major turning point for whether the country continues its progress toward democratic consolidation—and with it prospects for greater stability and economic opportunity—or slides back toward the exploitative governance model and impunity of previous decades.

Liberians remain traumatized from the predatory governance practices of the military coup that brought Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor to power. Their abuses of power triggered and perpetuated the catastrophic civil wars from 1989 to 2003, resulting in the deaths of 250,000 people out of a population of 5 million.

Recognizing the disastrous consequences of wantonly corrupt and unaccountable executive power, Liberians emerging from the war were determined to establish a system of checks and balances. This included an independent legislature and judiciary, an autonomous National Elections Commission (NEC), Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission, Central Bank, Public Procurement and Concessions Commission, and a small but professional military, among others. Many of these institutions were launched and facilitated, if not consolidated, under the presidency of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.

An often overlooked legacy of the civil war is the large number of disadvantaged youth, some of whom are former child soldiers, who struggle with homelessness, violence, and drug addiction. Sometimes part of urban street gangs, these so-called “zogos” are linked to a growing problem of narcotics addiction and increased violence in Monrovia.

The central issue to watch in Liberia’s 2023 elections will be how well the country’s nascent democratic institutions hold up against pressure to accommodate and reinstitute a strongman model of executive power.

In short, Liberia’s 2023 presidential election will test the country’s still fragile democratic institutions.

Madagascar: Presidential, November

The Madagascar 2023 presidential election is a reminder that democracy is far more than just holding elections. Therefore, the relevance of this election cycle can be best understood within the context of the country’s hollowed-out democratic institutions.

The island nation’s 30 million citizens are handicapped by a political system with concentrated power in the executive branch, overriding the checks and balances that enable a government to be responsive to the priorities of its citizens.

Strengthening the mechanisms of popular participation, power sharing, and accountability enabled by institutions like an independent legislature, judiciary, and media will be the real priority of Madagascar’s democratic development, regardless of which candidate emerges victorious from this year’s election.

Madagascar’s weak private sector means that government spending comprises a relatively significant share of the economy. Lacking adequate oversight mechanisms, political power becomes a means of personal self-enrichment. An estimated 90 percent of service contracts must be “validated” by the president and the prime minister. These dynamics create ongoing incentives for incumbents to stay in office. This also contributes to the limited political will to strengthen mechanisms of accountability. 

Madagascar’s weak governance oversight mechanisms and rich natural resources also make the country an attractive target for state capture by external actors. Russia was brazenly involved in trying to fix the outcome of the 2018 election through disinformation, paying journalists to write flattering stories, and hiring young people to attend rallies. Given the permissive environment and negligible reputational or financial costs, further Russian electoral interference can be expected in 2023. With it comes diminished popular sovereignty and a further barrier to responsive government.

With more than 80 percent of Madagascar’s flora and fauna being unique to the island, governance decisions in Madagascar have regional and international implications for global efforts to protect biodiversity and combat climate change.

DRC: Presidential and Legislative, December 20

The elections in the DRC)mark another important inflection point in this country’s long and elusive quest for democracy. The incumbent, President Felix Tshisekedi, is seeking a second 5-year term. Son of the esteemed democracy champion, Etienne Tshisekedi, Felix Tshisekedi had an ignoble start to his presidency – in the view of many, he cut a power-sharing deal with the outgoing president, Joseph Kabila, to be declared the victor of the December 2018 elections. 

Many democracy advocates are critical that the Tshisekedi-led National Assembly failed to pass an amendment requiring the electoral body to adopt electoral best practices such as announcing electoral results at each polling center. Tallying and reporting of aggregate results from a central location is less transparent and more prone to rigging. Additionally, the DRC relies on candidates gaining a plurality of votes rather than an absolute majority, making it easier for a candidate to win by solely appealing to their base rather than building a more inclusive coalition.

While the DRC’s electoral institutions and oversight mechanisms may be weak, the country has a vibrant and organized civil society committed to a democratic system of government. These groups continue to demand transparency and popular participation in elections and hold leaders accountable to citizen interests. Among the most prominent, CENCO deployed over 40,000 election monitors in 2018. Through the experience gained from multiple cycles of parallel vote-counting processes, it is increasingly difficult for candidates to credibly claim outcomes that deviate significantly from independent tallies.

Another wild card in the 2023 election is the ongoing instability in the east of the country. This is a multilayered conflict involving rivalries between Rwanda and Uganda, access to and trafficking of the DRC’s vast and unregulated mineral deposits, 140 local armed groups, ethnic rivalries, and legacies of previous conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Prospects of Chinese and Russian interests joining the competition for resources in the region adds another level of complexity. Perceptions that Tshisekedi may have made opaque deals for DRC’s resources also create a strong nationalist resentment that may have political consequences.

With so many uncertainties, the DRC polls may be the most unpredictable on the continent in 2023. While the DRC does not have a strong track record of transparent and credible elections, this remains the aspiration of millions of Congolese citizens. Experience has also shown that civil society will not blithely accept a fabricated outcome. Much may once again come down to the courts—and how regional and international actors respond.  ( (africacentre.org)