Understanding backlash against democracy in Africa

By Lise Rakner

There is a trend of democratic retrenchment across the African continent. Despite democratic gains in some states, the overall tendency over the past decade has been the erosion of democratic gains won in the period after 1990. 

Democracy is challenged in ways that pose threats to freedom of speech, association and information, the ability to choose political leaders, rule of law with recourse to independent courts, protection of personal integrity and private life. 

African states have adopted legal restrictions on key civil and political rights that form the basis of democratic rule in many countries from dominant party regimes, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania, to competitive democracies, like Zambia, Senegal and Malawi. In South Africa, where democracy and rule of law appear deeply institutionalised, succession battles suggest a weakening of institutions intended to check the Executive. 

Civil society actors, policy makers and scholars warn against the democratic backlash and its negative implications for domestic and international politics. Internationally, the African democratic backlash challenges global actors who have long pressured developing countries to politically liberalise. Yet, following what appears to be a global trend of democratic backsliding, space for international influence and the spread of liberal norms is closing rapidly. Domestically, the observed backlash against democracy may pose further social and political threats with wide-reaching implications for development. This may, in turn, challenge the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  Others argue that whereas closing space for civil society impacts on voice and participation first and foremost, restrictions on civil society ultimately may curb even the most seemingly apolitical activities such as humanitarian relief.

Democracy eroding from within

It is important to note that the current backlash against democracy differs from previous periods of democratic retrenchment. Contemporary processes of democratic backlash are slower in pace: now, democracies tend to erode and not break. In the 1970s, democratic breakdowns tended to result in abrupt military or one-party regime shifts. This is no longer the case. Since the end of the Cold War, almost 90 per cent of all countries in the world hold regular and at least minimally competitive elections. Yet, increasingly, we witness elections held under authoritarian conditions and incumbents manipulating the electoral process with no intention of succumbing their rule to electoral uncertainty and competition. 

A second distinctive feature characterising the contemporary democratic backlash is that it is primarily targeted at some institutions and some aspects of liberal democracy. Some democratic institutions are deliberately dismantled through legal and budgetary procedures, but other institutions may be thriving. Multiparty elections have become a regularised feature, yet democratically elected parliaments pass votes curtailing the independence of courts or electoral institutions intended to secure accountability in future electoral contests. 

Finally, and closely linked to the points above, a central feature of the ongoing backlash against democracy is that the undoing of a set of democratic rights and the institutions upholding it are legitimised through democratic institutions that often marshal broad popular support. This slow, piecemeal erosion of democracy from within means that it is exceedingly hard to pinpoint exactly when a political system transforms from one regime form to another. This again raises critical questions, like how do we know when a democracy is no longer a democracy? When do a regime change from one form to another?

What does the data say?

Is there evidence of a global democratic backlash? The answer is yes. According to Freedom House, the global average level of democracy has slipped back to where it was before the year 2000. On average, the decline has been moderate, and most changes have occurred within regime categories—with democracies becoming less liberal and autocracies less competitive and more repressive. 

According to the EIU democracy index, the African “mean score” has increased in this past decade from 4.11 to 4.28, yet below the global mean score at 5.52. The worrying trend is that the improvements happened in the period 2006-2011 and since progress has stagnated. Moreover, data suggests significant regional differences. The most distinct democratic improvements have taken place in North and West Africa. Of the ten countries in Africa where democracy has markedly decline according to the five-point democracy index, four are East African countries: Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi. 

A striking characteristic of the region that needs explaining is how little negative or positive regime change that has actually taken place since the conclusion of the democratic transitions of the mid-1990s. In the African context, when countries start holding regular multi-party elections, they largely continue to do so. Military coups that used to lead to lengthy periods of non-electoral politics, now get overturned quickly, because of both local and international pressures, and regular elections have become the default option of politics. This paradoxical continuity observed since the end of the transitions of the 1990s shows that the authoritarian reflexes in the executive have not changed markedly and the composition of the political class remains very similar. Indeed, in a youthful continent, the political class seems to continue to be getting older.

International responses

Puzzlingly, the ongoing backlash against democracy appears heavily concentrated in countries that made distinctly democratic gains in the 1990s.  African countries have traditionally been the recipient of high amounts of foreign aid, and as a result, benefited heavily from good governance support after the end of the Cold War at a time when the West had few competing interests. In the 1990s and 2000s, democracy assistance support resulted in a continent-wide growth of civil society organisations, the spread of basic human rights, and several successful national democratic transitions. 

Scholars and donors alike have spent a great deal of effort to study the institutionalisation of democratic rule on the African continent. Now, however, scholars, pundits and policymakers alike are struggling to explain the reverse: the ongoing backlash against democratic rule in Africa and how the international community can respond and counteract the ongoing erosion of democracy. 

But, responses from the international actors are challenged by the nature of the democratic backsliding. Incumbent governments employ formal democratic institutions and institutional mechanisms, set up with the support of the international community, in their attempt to roll back democracy, such as handsome majorities in the legislature won through electoral processes in part financed by international aid donors. The international community do not know how to respond to this trend, in part, because it is difficult to assess precisely when, how and which elements of democracy are eroding.

Arguably, international donors have performed relatively well in promoting and financing democratic institutions through engaging governments and power-holders. But governance assistance have been less successful in terms of identifying and assisting ‘change agents’ outside government. African governments are increasingly imposing restrictions on foreign funding to NGOs and civil society associations, leaving international donors with fewer options as support to human rights and democracy traditionally has been channelled through NGOs either directly or through transnational NGOs. With this door gradually closing, the only other door open to international support is through governments, the international community is increasingly finding itself in a situation where their remaining “tools” to promote democracy appear to support the increasingly more autocratic tendencies of African executives.

Emphasising the global character of the ongoing “democratic backsliding”, arguably, political leaders no longer feel the need to “make excuses” or pretend to adhere to democratic institutions and liberal norms. Similar arguments may be made about the international community. Based on the positive economic results and progress on some key SDGs by some of Africa’s authoritarian, dominant party states like Ethiopia and Rwanda, parts of the aid community now appear to question the validity and legitimacy of adherence to democracy being a condition for developing assistance. Observers now argue that competitive elections pose special dangers in low-income, poorly institutionalised political systems

Responses from civil society

African civil society associations are now facing a “double jeopardy.” They need increasing support from the international community to combat the retrenchment of democratic rights by their governments. Yet, due to governments imposing legal restrictions of NGOs receiving foreign funding, the same organisations are receiving less attention and financial support from the international community. As a result, both domestic civil society actors and international supporters are searching for new solutions. A number of recent studies and evaluations highlight the challenges posed by the “closing space for civil society engagement.”

Increasingly, there is reason to expect that African civil society organisations aiming to advance human rights and good governance now have to operate “from below,” that is, through grassroots networks of activists who form local civil society groups, non-governmental organisations, or social movements focused on the protection of civil liberties. Because such work ultimately challenges the legitimacy of governments that carry out repression, human rights activists, including lawyers, journalists, and academics, are themselves often targeted for politically motivated trials or violent persecution by government agents.  (